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In June 2014, Pekka called me and asked whether I would be 
interested in helping out with a course that he was planning on the 
history and current issues of sociological thought. That is how I 
ended up both assisting him and lecturing on Scottish 
Enlightenment social theory in what turned into a series of lecture 
courses with the rather ambitious title: The Sociological Promise 
from Hobbes to Post-modern Critics, Parts I–III. In this piece, I 
will reflect on some of the key themes of those courses. By doing so, 
I endeavour to reconstruct and contextualize Pekka’s conception of 
sociology, sociological theory, and its history as he has come to 
perceive it towards the end of his tenured academic career. 
The notion of sociological promise derives, of course, from C. 
Wright Mills’ modern classic, The Sociological Imagination (2000 
[1959]). ‘Sociological imagination’ and the concomitant ‘promise’ 
epitomized Mills’ alternative for the two then-dominant forms of 
sociological inquiry: the conceptual grand theorising of Talcott 
Parsons, and the ‘abstracted empiricism’ of quantitative social 
research in the vein of Paul Lazarsfeld and others. Neither of the 
two lived up to what Mills saw as the proper task of sociology, which 
was ’to grasp history and biography and the relations between the 
two within society’, so as to translate the personal troubles of 
people ‘into public issues, and public issues into the terms of their 
human meaning for a variety of individuals’ (ibid. 4, 187). 
Whatever the subject of a particular sociological study, then, it was 
to be sensitive to three kinds of background questions: those 
concerning (1) the structure of society as a whole and how it 
differed ‘from other varieties of social order’; (2) the historical 
making of that society and the forces changing it at the present; and 
(3) the ‘kinds of human nature’ that were ‘revealed in the conduct 
and character we observe in this society in this period’ (ibid., 4–
5). Sociology needed a theory of social structure or social order; 
otherwise it would run the risk of psychologizing explanations. But 
that theory – and here Parsons would fail – had to be sensitive to 
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history and empirical evidence that spoke of the existence of many 
kinds of social orders, and also of conflicts within societies. 
I think it is fair to say that Pekka’s oeuvre echoes Mills’ general 
outline for how sociology should be done, as witnessed, for 
instance, in his major book-length studies on the middle class, and 
the problems of lifestyle regulation in the (late) modern society, 
The European New Middle Class (1992) and The Saturated Society 
(2009). Relatedly, Pekka has been critical of contemporary 
sociology growing increasingly distant from this ideal (Sulkunen 
2014a). Much in keeping with Mills, he has noted a trend of 
sociologists becoming ‘mere behavioural scientists’ – as he once 
put it – who study diverse phenomena and problems of social life 
without connection to any theoretical understanding of society as a 
whole. This can be seen as a reflection of the fact that the notion of 
society as it derived from the classical period of sociology has been 
subject to much criticism during the past few decades. Following 
William Outhwaite, Pekka has delineated three streams or sources 
of this criticism as follows: 1) action theory where agency is given 
priority over structure; 2) post-modernism, either in the form of 
epistemic critique of sociological concepts, or as moral criticism 
levied against social science for having been part of the ‘modern 
project’ of rationalization-cum-oppression; and 3) globalization 
theories and their criticism of ‘nation’ being the fundamental point 
of reference in most sociological notions of society. (Sulkunen 
2007; 2014.) 
While some eminent sociologists have argued to the effect that 
the whole concept of society that implies some unifying principle 
has become obsolete (e.g. Baumann 2000; Beck 2005), one could 
equally claim that we live in a world where a sociological theory of 
what keeps societies together is needed more than ever. Pekka has 
argued that the historical realisation of the key components of 
Western subjectivity – autonomy and intimacy – has added a whole 
new matrix of differences and conflicts over the more traditional 
struggles based on class, status and gender (Sulkunen, 2009; 2011). 
Indeed, contemporary conflicts often manifest as symbolic 
conflicts where there seems to be no common ground for 
negotiation over tangible interests. This does not mean that the 
core problematic of sociological theory, the one concerning unity 
and difference in society, has become obsolete. Quite the contrary, 
new sociological insights are needed for understanding both 
integration and conflict. While we may not find ready answers from 
Durkheim or Marx, sociology, in Pekka’s view, still needs to stick to 
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the classical sociological way of theorizing, where the conditions of 
social order and the logic of conflicts are sought in ‘the social’ itself, 
rather than in some external force or ‘the political’ as such. Equally, 
sociology has to keep fighting what Bourdieu called ‘the 
anthropological monster’, the vulgar view of human nature as 
driven solely by self-interest and utilitarian calculus. In this task, 
Pekka held, perusal of the historical foundations of social theory is 
of much value. 
The reason for going all the way back to early modern thinkers 
was that the idea of ‘society on its own’ first started to take shape in 
that era. Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) was an important 
catalyst for this development, as much of Enlightenment social 
theory relevant to sociology today emerged as a reaction to Hobbes’ 
theory of the political society and its underlying presuppositions 
concerning the human nature. Writing in the wake of the Civil War 
in England and the more general crisis of divine and natural 
legitimizations of monarchies in post-Reformation Europe, 
Hobbes strived to provide a philosophical justification for the 
necessity of absolutist government. Famously, he postulated a 
conception of human nature where the only motive common to us 
all was self-interest that aimed at self-preservation, while the rest 
of our individual desires varied greatly. With no guarantee that 
others respect our life as they pursue their own desires, this led to 
precautious action and war of all against all in the pre-political state 
of nature. The only way out of this misery – as reason suggested – 
was a social contract whereby every individual handed their right 
to defend themselves over to a sovereign ruler. Social order, thus, 
could be based only on political authority that took up and 
monopolized the task of judging and preventing injustices among 
disparate individuals. 
The most notable strand of normative political analysis that 
emerged as a reaction to Hobbesian absolutism was arguably the 
one commonly identified with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory of 
the social contract and the origins of inequality. Pekka has recently 
published on Roussseauvian Republicanism and its paradoxes, 
drawing especially on Reinhart Koselleck (Sulkunen, 2014a). He 
also gave insightful presentations on the subject during the lecture 
courses. However, here I want to move on to discuss the Scottish 
Enlightenment, where the normative social contract theories were 
substituted with more empirical and, in my view, more properly 
sociological analysis of society and social order by the likes of David 
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Hume, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson. This is also a theme 
where Pekka’s and my own scholarly interests overlapped the most. 
In my own lecture that drew notably on Christopher Berry’s 
(1997) work, I presented the general features of the Scottish turn 
towards a more sociological inquiry of society as follows (Ruuska, 
2015). In epistemic terms, it built on a view that any theory of 
society was to be based on empirical evidence. Hume and others 
criticized the Hobbesian – and also the Rousseauvian – state of 
nature as ‘philosophical fiction’ that was of little use, as it did not 
correspond with the evidence we had of people having always lived 
in societies, ‘joined by affection to one party’ while ‘possibly 
opposed to another’, as Adam Ferguson (2007 [1767], 9) would put 
it. Relatedly, the methodological individualism and rationalism of 
the social contract theories was rebutted. Individuals did not form 
societies through deliberate contracts. Instead, societies pre-
existed specific individuals. The character of individuals and 
groups, their beliefs and opinions took shape in historical societies. 
So did the various forms of government and their justifications that 
we could observe across times and nations. Furthermore, human 
beings were rational, for sure, but reason was not the basis of 
sociability and its variable institutional manifestations. Rather, we 
were ultimately moved by passions, selfish as well as benevolent, 
and this was the direction in which we were to seek for the causes 
and dynamics of our social behaviour. While the founding figure of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, Frances Hutcheson still argued that 
natural and universal benevolence was the foundation of virtuous 
sociability, David Hume and Adam Smith went on to place at the 
centrepiece the psychological faculties of imagination and 
sympathy by which we could assume a spectator’s viewpoint to our 
own passions and actions, and enter into sentiments of others. This 
intersubjective feature of human nature facilitated the channelling 
and balancing our selfish and unsocial passions in sociable ways. 
This very idea opened a new way for conceptualizing the 
foundations and functions of social institutions in large societies 
that could not be held together by our necessarily limited 
benevolent affections.  
For Pekka, it was precisely the dynamics of passions, sympathy 
and the institutions of society that had drawn him to scrutinize the 
Scottish Enlightenment more carefully since around the turn of the 
21st century. Here he reflects the more general trend of the past few 
decades whereby especially Adam Smith has been ‘rediscovered’ 
and vindicated also by sociologists as an insightful theorist of the 
The sociological promise and the Enlightenment 
56 
social bond and society (e.g. Barbalet, 1998). In Finland, notably 
Risto Kangas’ thesis on the history of sociology and the concept of 
society, Yhteiskunta (2001), paid close attention to Smith’s Theory 
of Moral Sentiments around the same time, and this was not left 
unnoticed by Pekka (Sulkunen 2002). Most recently, Pekka’s 
interest in the Enlightenment has been stimulated by a renowned 
study on Bernard Mandeville and David Hume by Mikko Tolonen 
(2013), who also gave three lectures on the courses. Tolonen’s 
reading of Mandeville and Hume advances the understanding of 
some of the key sociological insights of Enlightenment thought. 
Indeed, for Pekka, it went straight to the core of the question 
concerning social order in large societies that are constituted by 
autonomous agents (Sulkunen 2014b). 
A doctor, satirist and philosopher of Dutch origin, Mandeville is 
commonly regarded as the proponent of a view that self-interest is 
not only the fundamental moving force of human nature, but also 
a source of public benefits if freed from the chains imposed by 
hypocrite moralists and politicians. Tolonen (2013), however, 
brings to light a change in Mandeville’s thought in a later edition of 
his infamous Fable of the Bees that made room in human 
motivation also for benevolent passions, but even more notably for 
what Mandeville called self-liking. Self-liking or pride referred to a 
natural human inclination or desire to value and feel satisfied with 
oneself. The sociologically notable point here is that pride 
necessitated a social context where we could confirm our opinion 
of ourselves by others’ approval. The necessity of taking regard to 
others’ opinion of us modified and cultivated not only our 
expressions of pride but also our pursuit of self-interest. This 
engendered general moral conceptions of honour and individual 
sovereignty that were crucial to social order in large societies.  
Hume and Smith developed this line of argument further in their 
theories of how we – by way of the psychological mechanism of 
sympathy – form emotionally founded judgments concerning our 
own and others’ conduct, merit and demerit. These relational 
processes were the foundation of the key socially constructed 
virtue, justice, which modified and levelled the expression our 
unsocial passions, hatred and anger. Importantly, Hume and Smith 
noted that in large societies where the social distance between 
individuals may grow wide, social cohesion has to be founded on 
generalized conceptions of justice, which have to be consolidated 
into institutional arrangements maintained and administered by a 
‘political society’ or government (see Sulkunen 2014a; 2014b). ‘The 
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social’, rather than ‘the political’, still remains the fundamental 
foundation of social order. As noted above, governments are not 
formed through contracts or plans, and their authority is not based 
on deliberate acts whereby individuals give their consent to be 
ruled (Hume 1987, II.XII). Rather, governments take shape 
historically, as part of more general social processes, and it is ‘time 
and custom’ that give ‘authority to all forms of government and 
all successions of princes’ (Hume 2011 [1739/1740], 3.2.10). The 
social nature of this process entails that any government – both the 
most despotic and the most free – is dependent on the opinion of 
its subjects, on people’s interests and their emotionally founded 
judgments concerning the virtues of the government (Hume 1987, 
I.IV.1). 
For Pekka, the sociological relevance of the Scottish 
Enlightenment laid essentially in the idea – even if still somewhat 
elementary in its form in Mandeville, Hume and Smith – that a 
‘society standing on its own’ hinges on general principles of justice 
and worth that also make social hierarchies and inequalities 
comprehensible and manageable. This very insight has since been 
elaborated by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (2006) who hail 
from the school of Bourdieu, a major source of influence also for 
Pekka since the early 1980s (see Sulkunen 1982; 2009). In Pekka’s 
view, their theory of justification steers clear from the one-
sidedness inherent in the classical sociological integration and 
conflict theories. Conflict and integration have to be taken as ‘equal 
partners’ in any theory that aims to facilitate analysis of social 
order, unity and difference. Inequalities and differences will always 
be part of any social order, as Boltanski and Thévenot argue. A 
central – and we could say very Millsian – task for sociology is to 
translate the ensuing conflicts that often take the form of diffuse 
symbolic struggles into negotiable issues of concrete interests and 
justification. The underlying conflicts may be over conceptions of 
the common good, the meaning of dignity and the order of worth, 
or the principles of belonging and differentiation – the three 
dimensions of justification that are required by any social order, 
but whose contents are subject to historical change. (Sulkunen 
2015.)  
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